

# Can Gender Quotas Improve Public Service Provision? Evidence from Indian Local Government

Varun Karekurve-Ramachandra\*

Alexander Lee<sup>†</sup>

August 4, 2023

## Abstract

What effect do gender quotas have on political responsiveness? We examine the effect of randomly imposed electoral quotas for women in Mumbai's city council, using a wide variety of objective and subjective measures of constituency-level public service quality. Quotas are associated with differences in the distribution of legislator effort, with quota members focusing on public goods distribution, while non-quota members focus on individual goods, member perks, and identity issues. These differences in effort seem to influence institutional performance: perceived quality of local public goods is higher in constituencies with quota members, and citizen complaints are processed faster in areas with more quota members. We suggest that men's more extensive engagement with extralegal and rhetorical forms of political action has led to men and women cultivating different styles of political representation.

---

\*Assistant Professor, Political Science and International Relations, University of Southern California. A significant portion of this manuscript was completed when Varun was a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Rochester, and the inaugural Gerhard Casper Postdoctoral Fellow in Rule of Law at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. Email: [varun.rama@usc.edu](mailto:varun.rama@usc.edu)

<sup>†</sup>Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Email: [alexander.mark.lee@rochester.edu](mailto:alexander.mark.lee@rochester.edu)  
The authors gratefully acknowledge the PEPR grant from Wallis Institute of Political Economy that funded a part of this research. Our thanks to Milind Mhaske, Yogesh Mishra, and Swapneel Thakur from Praja Foundation who graciously shared the data and to Michael Anderson, Damian Clarke, Jessica Gottlieb, and Cyrus Samii, who shared their feedback and code. Seminar participants at the University of Rochester's Department of Political Science, and Susan B. Anthony Institute for Gender, Sexuality, & Women's Studies, University of Pennsylvania's Center for the Advanced Study of India, SoCal Political Economy and Institutions Workshop at Caltech, Organisational Behaviour Group at The Indian School of Business, and EGEN 2020 Summer Working Group made the paper better with their feedback and encouragement. Finally, we are grateful for help, comments, and suggestions from Priyadarshi Amar, Abhijit Banare, Britt Bolin, Shashwat Dhar, Zuheir Desai, Olga Gasparyan, Mike Gibilisco, Tanushree Goyal, Annabelle Hutchinson, Yazad Jal, Mayya Komisarchik, Rithika Kumar, Tanu Kumar, Rajeshwari Majumdar, Bethany Lacina, Sergio Montero, Bhumi Purohit, Blair Read, Johanna Rickne, Franziska Roscher, Amna Salam, Maria Silfa, Pavan Srinath, and Jessica Sun. Responsibility for any errors remains our own.

# 1 Introduction

In virtually all democracies, fewer women are elected to political office than men. One of the most commonly proposed solutions to rectify this imbalance is the imposition of quotas for the election or nomination of women (Htun, 2004; Krook and O'Brien, 2010). These quotas increase the descriptive representation and political participation of women (Bhavnani, 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008; Goyal, 2020a), and may indirectly improve social attitudes towards them too (Beaman et al., 2009). Equally importantly, elected women are widely thought to be more likely to substantively represent women, emphasizing issue areas that women find important, and allocate money and attention to these areas (Thomas, 1991; Swers, 2002; Reingold, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Clots-Figueras, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; Brulé, 2020; Clayton and Zetterberg, 2018).

While quota members are more likely to invest time and effort on issues valued by women, what is their overall effect on representative behavior? Quotas might plausibly lead to lower levels of effort, or less effective effort, due to the relative social and political marginalization of women. Quota candidates are less experienced and less educated than other candidates (Ban and Rao, 2008; Afridi, Iversen and Sharan, 2017; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Karekurve-Ramachandra and Lee, 2019), possibly leading to lower levels of political “skill.” Female legislators elected via quotas may also be excluded from positions of power and having their public interventions judged differently than men, limiting their effectiveness (De Wit, 2016).

This paper suggests that these beliefs are not correct, and that quotas can be associated with very different styles of representation. These changes stem *from* the obstacles faced by female legislators in poor democracies. Because men have access to opportunities for individual distribution and rhetorical self-promotion that are usually denied to women, men often pursue strategies for personal and career advancement that have little effect on public goods provision. Denied these opportunities, quota candidates seek to advance their political careers through formal processes of constituency service<sup>1</sup>, creating a “gendered division of political work” (Daby, 2020). Overall, this means that quotas should be associated with an overall improvement in citizen satisfaction with public service provisioning.

This paper examines the effects of gender quotas in Indian local government with a focus on the municipal corporation of Greater Mumbai. One major advantage of focusing on Mumbai is that the implementa-

---

<sup>1</sup>We follow (Bussell, 2019, 17) who in turn paraphrases (Fenno, 2003), when defining constituency service: “as service responsiveness that does not involve attention to the partisanship or history of political support of the individual or group making a request.”

tion of quotas is randomized at the constituency level, thereby eliminating the selection problem in quota imposition.<sup>2</sup> The powerful, professionalized, and fiercely partisan council of Mumbai also bears a close resemblance to the state and national Indian legislatures to which the extension of quotas is currently being proposed through a constitutional amendment.

Quotas are associated with differences in the distribution of member inputs, including 1) their attendance at both city-wide council and local ward meetings, 2) the issue distribution of questions asked in these meetings, and 3) the proportion of constituency development funds disbursed. Since we are seeking to estimate the *overall* effect of quotas, for each of these families. We estimate the average treatment effect across issue areas. Quota women are more likely than other members to expend effort on constituency service, attending local ward meetings and asking legislative questions related to public goods. Non-quota candidates, by contrast pursue activities likely to either bring them to the attention of party higher ups or build up a personal following: Attending council meetings and asking questions related to identity politics, individual goods distribution and the corporation's internal operations.

We suggest that these differences in effort stem from the fact that women are excluded from certain types of political activity. Due to strong norms of gendered activities and gendered spaces, quota women are less likely to be a part of the existing informal networks where many political decisions are made in Mumbai, and less likely to have their public presence valorized. However, this strategy does not necessarily mean that quota women perform worse from their constituent's point of view: On the contrary, the strategies that men pursue to get ahead in Indian politics appear to not be associated with improvements in quality of life for citizens. Often, these "normal" political strategies are illegal: non-quota members are also eight times more likely to face criminal charges than quota women. Quota women, by contrast, appear more focused on providing services through formal channels, either because of social norms that they work within are less like to discourage this type of effort, or simply the fact that they are spending less time on rhetoric and patronage. These results echo qualitative observations about the different representative styles of male and female members (Bedi, 2016), with male members focused personal ambition and operating within closed and gendered local networks based on "money and muscle" (Vaishnav, 2017).

Do these difference in effort have effects on actual service provision? We focus on the ability of members to improve the quality of life of their constituents, using two different families of measures. A first set of subjective measures, taken from an annual survey of each electoral ward in Mumbai captures citizen

---

<sup>2</sup>Note that since women can run in non-quota constituencies, we are estimating the effect of gender quotas rather than gender.

perceptions of local conditions across 14 policy areas. A second set of measures, which has the advantage of avoiding the problems of gendered perceptions that is inherent in the survey data, captures the time that each administrative ward takes to respond to citizen complaints. Overall, people perceive local public goods to be of higher quality in constituencies with gender quotas. Ward committees with a higher proportion of quota members also process citizen complaints more quickly. While we do find some evidence that quota members are especially good at advocating issues traditionally thought to be associated with women, the results extend across a wide variety of areas. We find no evidence that this stems from differences in political “skill” or efficiency (if anything, quota members are less formally qualified), and only limited evidence for differences in member incentives, though the positive effect of quotas on perceived performance is attenuated in years with state and national elections, when men have greater incentives to perform in order to be nominated for these offices, for which there are no gender quotas.

The results seem to imply that the distributional differences associated with quotas are not associated with losses in commitment.<sup>3</sup> Despite operating in a political system that offers them relatively weak career incentives and systematic sexism, quota women appear to provide greater improvement in quality of life to their constituents when compared to other candidates, and to cultivate a distinct – and possibly lastingly beneficial – style of representation.

## 2 Gender Quotas and Representation

### 2.1 Gender Quotas and Distribution

The underrepresentation of women in public office is a widespread phenomenon in all types of democracies, whose cause is widely debated (see the recent review in [Lawless \(2015\)](#)). To rectify this imbalance, as of March 2019 more than 80 countries have some form of quota system that guarantees women either the exclusive right to run in a specific set of constituencies or specific positions on a party list.<sup>4</sup> These quotas mechanically increase the descriptive representation of women in quota seats, which may increase descriptive representation in subsequent elections and at higher levels of government ([Bhavnani, 2009](#); [Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer, 2018](#); [Karekurve-Ramachandra, 2020](#); [Goyal, 2020b](#); [Kaur and Philips,](#)

---

<sup>3</sup>Various versions of this statement were mentioned during author interviews with elected representatives during fieldwork in India in 2017. Name and affiliation withheld to preserve anonymity.

<sup>4</sup>The Gender Quotas Database (<https://tinyurl.com/GQuota-Db>) provides easily accessible information on the various types of quotas in existence today.

2023), partisan contact and activism (Goyal, 2020a) and descriptive representation at the leadership level (O'Brien and Rickne, 2016). While descriptive representation may have positive impacts in its own right (Beaman et al., 2009), many scholars have focused on issues involving *substantive* representation: whether women elected through quotas advocate for positions important to women. On balance, studies have found positive substantive representation effects (Swers, 2002; Reingold, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008; Clots-Figueras, 2011; Brulé, 2020; Iyer et al., 2012; Clayton and Zetterberg, 2018), though these effects are not necessarily large relative to the effects of other forms of female activism (Weldon, 2002), and are conditional on the structure of the party system (Walsh, 2012; Karekurve-Ramachandra, 2020).<sup>5</sup>

The theoretical logic behind such *distributional* effects of changes in descriptive representative is straightforward, and extends to other types of ascriptive identities such as race, ethnicity and religion (Minta and Sinclair-Chapman, 2013; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson, 2017; Lee, 2018). Individuals from a particular group often share the preferences of other people in that group, and thus are more likely to spend time promoting policies or providing services that align with group preferences. In Chattopadhyay and Duflo's (2004) canonical example, women in rural India are disproportionately involved in collecting drinking water, and female representatives focus more on providing drinking water. Alternatively, candidates from a group might have information about the group's needs or preferences that is not available to other candidates, might gain some cognitive benefit from helping members of their own group, or might be more easily socially sanctioned for non-performance by group members.

## 2.2 Gender Quotas and Member Behavior

Politicians provide benefits to their constituents, both directly through advocacy with the bureaucracy, or indirectly through vote and debating legislation, and are motivated to maximize their own flow of rents, either through reelection, advancement to higher office, party office, or private rents. This flow of rents is controlled by party leaders and wealthy individuals (who provide nominations, campaign contributions, and bribes) and voters (who control elections, and whose loyalty makes politicians more valuable as brokers). While politicians do not directly care about citizen perceptions, these perceptions thus have an indirect effect on their utility.

---

<sup>5</sup>Clayton (2015) finds no effects on self-reported engagement of female legislators.

Three factors might influence where members allocate effort, and thus the overall production of constituent benefits. First, members might have different levels of *electoral incentives* based on the electoral conditions. A politician certain to win reelection, or certain to lose reelection would have little reason to expend effort on service provision (Keefer and Khemani, 2009), and the same logic would apply to politicians with a greater or lesser chance of promotion to higher office. Second, there may be differences in the *skills* that enable politicians to translate effort into success in constituency service or policy advocacy: Some politicians may have better interpersonal skills, better connections, greater knowledge of bureaucratic rules, etc. Third, politicians may receive different returns from their *alternative strategies* to constituency service. They may attempt to become politically popular through means other than issue advocacy or local public good provision, such as clientelistic distribution or rhetorical activity that does not improve constituent well being.

How might these abilities and motivations be affected by gender quotas? If women were identical to men other than having different preferences, we would have no reason to expect quotas to affect performance, and the only substantive effects would be distributional (though these might be important in their own right). However, female politicians may differ from men in their personal attributes and their relationship to the political system, not least because of long traditions of social discrimination against women and prejudice against women in politics.

Most existing arguments would lead us to believe that in democracies where such discrimination is strong, gender quotas should lead to lower levels of skill, and lower incentives, leading to lower levels of effort. Besley et al. (2017), Weeks and Baldez (2015) and Baltrunaite et al. (2014) find that in Europe women elected through quotas are better educated than the men they replace, simply because they are not drawn from the existing pool of “mediocre men” recruited through processes based on personal ties rather than skill. Even in Uganda Josefsson (2014) and O’Brien (2012) find that that quota and non-quota candidates have similar qualifications. However, in some developing democracies we should expect quotas to have the opposite effect. For instance, in India the male literacy rate is 82.1% whereas for women it is 65.5%. If earnings and education are thought to be correlated with politician quality, forcing parties and voters to choose from a “lower quality” segment of society might potentially lower the “quality” of the candidate pool. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Ban and Rao (2008) find that in Indian village councils quota candidates are less educated than others, as well as being younger, poorer and having less political knowledge, while Cheema et al. (2021) show that male relatives serve as “gatekeepers” to female

political participation. These qualities and disadvantages might plausibly be related to lowered success as a representative: A representative with weaker political knowledge, for instance, might be less able to manipulate the bureaucracy to bring services to their constituents.<sup>6</sup> Quota women might also be denied the resources or opportunities to rise to more powerful positions where they can help their constituency. If they are able to keep all the key resources in their own hands, non-quota members will tend to perform better than quota ones. While it is possible that women have higher levels of unobserved skill than men at a given level of qualification, due to “Jackie Robinson effects” (Anzia and Berry, 2011; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014), but this argument is not applicable to women elected through quotas, who do not have to compete with men, and are thus not subject to the type of selection effects focused on in this literature.

A related claim is that female quota candidates might be more susceptible to capture by elites. The set of empirical findings on this issue, mostly drawn from Indian village council elections, is mixed. On the one hand, Bardhan, Mookherjee and Torrado (2010) find that quotas improve the targeting of some programs while worsening others, but – consistent with an elite capture story – any improvements are lower in villages with higher land inequality. Whereas Afridi, Iversen and Sharan (2017) find that while leakage in a large antipoverty program is initially worse under female leaders, these differences disappear over time. Further, Ban and Rao (2008) find that quotas have no effect on targeting, though experienced women perform better than men.

Women may also have weaker electoral incentives than equally ambitious men due to discrimination in parts of the political career path not covered by quotas. Norris and Inglehart (2001, 126) find that while one in seven parliamentarians internationally is a woman, only one in ten cabinet ministers and one in 20 heads of government are women. While women are guaranteed representation within quota constituencies in Indian local government, their rates of election afterwards are quite low – Bhavnani (2009) finds that women have a 8.6% chance of election after the withdrawal of quotas. Additionally, their chances in pursuing higher office, where there are no reservations, are often relatively small, and almost always smaller than their chances in quota seats—in India about 10.6% of members of the national parliament (which does not have quotas) were women in 2009 (Jensenius, 2016), even with a 50% quota for women in local government.<sup>7</sup> If quota members are going to be kicked out of office at the end of their term no matter how they perform, and have no

---

<sup>6</sup>Some authors have found that female legislators in the United States have a more consensus-oriented, and possibly more effective, political style (Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer, 2013). However, this finding has been contested and does not necessarily extend to the effects of gender quotas.

<sup>7</sup>See also Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer (2018).

possibility of rising to higher office, this might reduce their incentive to expend effort to advance the interests of their constituents. This was the critique of quotas most commonly voiced by (male) Indian politicians during our fieldwork: They claimed that women would never devote the same attention to “nursing” a constituency as men committed to rising to higher office.

### **2.3 Why Gender Quotas Might Improve Provision**

However, despite the fact that skill and incentive arguments might lead us to expect that gender quotas should lead to lower levels of political effort in developing democracies, there are reasons to expect that the opposite is the case. These stem from the different opportunities available to women and men — specifically, the returns that each obtains from activities other than legislative advocacy and constituency service. If women are less effective at these outside activities, or are excluded from them entirely, they might devote themselves to constituency service for want of alternative avenues for career enhancement.

There are many styles of effective representation of constituent interests. It is possible to be a highly effective legislator without ever participating in the chamber, perhaps only attending party or committee meetings, while others participate to advocate for positions that are important to them or their constituents. However, there are certain types of chamber participation that have little conceivable relationship to the material well being of their constituencies. Members might advocate for purely symbolic ends, such as new holidays or street renaming, or for legislation that is the responsibility of some other level of government. Alternatively, they might use the legislature as a forum to attack personal or partisan rivals, or members of other racial, ethnic or religious groups.

Women legislators are less likely to participate in such symbolic activities because they are less likely to be rewarded for *any* type of speech act. As [Karpowitz and Mendelberg \(2014\)](#) have shown, women are less likely to participate in debate and deliberation in a wide range of settings, and are judged negatively by others if they do. The negative consequences of women speaking up are likely to be even more severe in settings with more traditional gender norms: [Ban and Rao \(2009\)](#) find large differences in participation across genders in Indian village councils. Participation of women in such settings might be perceived as inappropriate or “pushy” and be socially or electorally sanctioned.

The other major alternative strategy is individual goods distribution. In some polities, male politicians gain advancement through the conditional, and often illicit distribution of state resources. These resources may be retained by the politician himself, might be transferred to a party leader in return for career advance-



ment, or be conditionally transferred to citizens in return for future electoral support—clientelism proper. Such activities are time consuming, and will tend to distract from the licit distribution of state resources to citizens through public goods and programmatic distribution. They are also only accessible to members of specific types of networks, which are often inaccessible to women. [Daby \(2020\)](#), focusing on brokers in Argentina, finds that women have more difficulties in operating in clientelistic environment “due to their participation in different problem-solving networks,” and their inability to effectively sanction disloyalty, a finding echoed by [Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer \(2019\)](#). Similarly, [Clayton and Zetterberg \(2021, 869\)](#) find that in Africa “women are less able than men to use clientelism to establish a political following.” Other recent work on gender quotas has found that female office holders have access to very different social networks than male candidates, and that quotas expand network diversity of officeholders overall ([Goyal, 2020a](#); [Barnes and Holman, 2020](#)). Below, we will present evidence that the “gender gap in political clientelism” extends to urban India as well.

An ambitious women must thus tend to focus on activities where she faces no such comparative disadvantage, most importantly the provision of public services through formal channels. Since such provision is tied to the politician’s official position, success is less dependent on access to established, gendered, political networks. Formal constituency service, which requires little public aggressiveness, may also be less consistent with traditional gender norms, and perhaps even valorized as “maternal.” In contexts where informal networks and the public sphere are highly gendered, success as a local representative may be one of the few avenues for women to rise to higher office, and a relatively more important path than for men [Goyal \(2020b, 19-20\)](#). Many women enter office through participation in women’s groups ([Prillaman, 2017](#)) which can further encourage the gender segregation of political networks.

We should note that even though women may have a comparative advantage in public service provision, this does not mean that they are advantaged in an absolute sense, since they may still face a male backlash for entering what are traditionally male political spaces, and it may take considerable courage for women to assert themselves in front of bureaucrats ([Gupta, 2012](#)), with whom they may have weaker ties ([Purohit, 2021](#); [Gupta and Chhibber, 2022](#)),

### 3 Gender Quotas in India

#### 3.1 Local Government in Mumbai

The empirical tests will focus on the performance of local legislators in India's commercial hub, Mumbai. The "corporation" that governs Mumbai is responsible for a wide variety of services including essential services like housing, land use planning, recreation, schooling, public health, trash removal, etc. Mumbai has a single local body with 227 corporators/councilors. Local corporators are elected every five years from single member districts using a plurality system. The corporation is dominated by a single right-wing party, the Marathi nationalist Shiva Sena, but they face vigorous competition a variety of opposition parties. The Mumbai corporation is regarded as being corrupt, a point to which we will return below.

Budgetary and policy decisions are made by the corporators and implemented by professional staff, similar to the American municipal council-manager system. Mumbai has been divided into 24 administrative wards, governed by ward committees made up of the corporators elected from each ward. The ward governments are regarded as less important than the main corporation mainly due to their limited budgetary authority and lack of jurisdiction over some issues where the the possibilities for corruption are most extensive. That said, they responsible for resolving a number of common public problems, including water, drainage and garbage.

Like the state and national legislatures, local bodies in India tend to be weak institutionally, due to limited committee systems and laws that drastically limit the ability of members to vote against the interest of party leaders (Lee, 2019). It is thus unrealistic to expect corporators to "legislate" or to influence programmatic policymaking—to the extent broad policy decisions are made, they are made by state-level party leaders who do not hold corporation seats. However, corporators are kept very busy doing constituent service, both administering their own discretionary funds for constituency improvements and mediating between citizens and the bureaucracy (Bedi, 2016; De Wit, 2016). Local people thus have strong expectations that their corporator will improve their well-being (De Wit, 2016).

It is worth pointing out some differences between these elections and the village elections on which the literature on gender quotas in India has previously focused. First, while village elections are officially non-partisan, urban body elections are virulently partisan, with nominations being determined centrally by party leaders. Second, constituencies are much larger: In 2011, each corporator represented approximately

55,000 people in Mumbai, while gram panchayats in North India average between 900 and 1500 persons (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). Third, the financial stakes are much higher in absolute terms: In 2018, the Mumbai corporation’s budget was equivalent to 3.86 billion US dollars, whereas in 2004 the average Madhya Pradesh panchayat had a budget of 12,200 US dollars. For these reasons, we believe that these elections provide a good counterfactual for evaluating what the effect of gender quotas in state and national elections, a question that is currently the subject of policy debate in India.

### 3.2 The Implementation of Gender Quotas

With the implementation of the 73rd constitutional amendment in 1993, all Indian local bodies are mandated to have at least one-third of seats “reserved” for women. The percentage of reserved seats has been increased to 50% in almost all the states since 2006. Reservation is carried out at the constituency level: In each cycle, in a pre-announced set of constituencies only women are allowed to contest for office.<sup>8</sup> Both men and women can run in the remaining constituencies, though in practice the election of women in unreserved constituencies is rare: Only 3% of Mumbai corporators were women before the policy’s implementation, and only 10% of unreserved seats are held by women. Overlaying the reservations for women are reservations for members of specific historically marginalized categories of caste (the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in Mumbai). Unlike reservations for women, these caste reservations are allotted based on the local populations of these categories.

Gender reservation is done randomly in Mumbai. The reservation is a true lottery, with numbers drawn from a drum in public. Both the lottery and the numbering of constituencies are conducted by the independent State Election Commission of Maharashtra. The implementation of electoral reservations in India are widely believed to be truly random and unrelated to constituency-level traits (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Ban and Rao, 2008; Clots-Figueras, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; Afridi, Iversen and Sharan, 2017; Goyal, 2020a,b; Karekurve-Ramachandra and Lee, 2019). Bhavnani (2009) provides specific and extensive discussion of the random incidence of reservations in Mumbai, including specific examples of high-level leaders who have been unseated by the policy. Table A.4 on page A-4 in the appendix provides evidence that the assignment of gender quotas is balanced with respect to observable attributes of wards.

---

<sup>8</sup>Local government constituencies in India are called “wards.” However, in Mumbai “ward” also refers to separate, larger administrative divisions. To avoid confusion, throughout we use the term “constituency” to describe electoral wards.

Note that the quota lottery is stratified based on caste reservation status, but not on ward. Since the wards are relatively small (between 2 and 18 members), there is considerable variation in the percentage of quota members in each ward committee, with observed values ranging from 0% (0/7) to 100% (2/2).

### **3.3 Gender Quotas in Mumbai Politics: Alternative Strategies**

Politicians in Mumbai can, and often do, provide services to their constituency, and expect that this will make them more popular. However, there are other ways in which members can advance their careers and enrich themselves. Much of the political game in India, and in particular in Mumbai, is thought to focus on the illegal diversion of state resources, or the use of the state's authority to sanction private lawbreaking—the 'crime-politics' nexus (Vaishnav, 2017). This may involve politicians in criminal acts including physical violence, and many face criminal charges. More ambiguously, clientelistic distribution is important in India's "patronage democracy": politicians and "brokers" provide jobs, housing, access to subsidized food and other particularistic goods to voters conditional on their support. These activities are intended not only to win support from voters but also from the party elites who control nomination decisions – as De Wit (2016) shows. Members are expected to make contributions, in cash, to party leaders, over and above the expenses of funding their own campaigns.

Importantly for our purposes, this behavior is heavily gendered, with direct behavior in lawbreaking behavior or transactional politics considered "unladylike". In a society where ordinary transactional politics is considered "dirty" and immoral and women are expected to conform to higher moral standards than men, women's participation in such activities faces strong social disapproval—female politicians are expected to "keep up the posture as housewife to preserve the family honor" (Quoted in Holzner and de Wit (2003, 18)). Many Indian men express attitudes on these issues that ascribe superior morality to women but peripheralize them for that very reason. One male Mumbai corporator told De Wit (2016, 169) that "Women can never do this dirty work" while one commentator actually explained women's low participation in politics through the rise of extralegal political brokers, stating that "Since these power-brokers came to be despised and mistrusted by all self-respecting, decent politically active people, it is not surprising that most women turned away from politics. A woman would be seriously jeopardizing her reputation by being associated with the likes of [corrupt politicians]" (Kishwar, 1996). In the language of our theory, women are excluded from the clientelistic networks that are at the center of a great deal of Mumbai politics

In fact, even entering the physical spaces where this type of political exchange occurs, or drinking the alcohol that often accompanies it, may be difficult for women. De Wit (2016, 169) reports that “Women are much more restricted than men in frequenting important (informal) meetings: in a bar, in a car, in the evening, or even go and meet people on her own.” These concerns are not merely reputational – in one 1998 case a female Navi Mumbai corporator was doused with kerosene and burned to death during an argument over the location of a water pump (Raval, Sheela, 1998) – and have tangible consequences for member behavior. Van Dijk (2007) in her study of Mumbai corporators, found that men are more likely than women to interact with other politicians, ethnic associations, and service organizations within their constituencies, leading to very different network structures.<sup>9</sup>

As a result of this exclusion, female politicians are thus perceived, at times incorrectly, as being “above corruption” (Bedi, 2016, 91). There is some empirical support for this claim. Panel A in Table A.3 on page A-3 shows that women who won office in quota seats are less likely than others to be facing criminal charges when elected—4% of women vs. 30% of men. While many of these women have male relatives who face charges, there are undoubtedly differences in the directness of women’s involvement in criminal activities.

Our findings echo Bedi’s (2016) ethnographic study of female corporators in Mumbai, Bedi (153) finds that “Women in political parties in India (particularly those who function at the local levels) are therefore still seen within their communities as committed to social justice rather than simply to political ambition.” This reflects the different roles they inhabit (and are assigned) within political parties. Women are rewarded for participation in *samajkaaran* [social work, community service] while men are seen as more focused on *rajkaaran* [politics, political work]. This distinction was emphasized by Bedi’s informants, who saw office as a way of performing this type of community service rather than an end in itself: “We need to do 80% samajkaran and 20% rajkaran. I have not played the game of rajkaran” (Bedi, 2016, p.89). Further, Ghosh and Lama-Rewal (2005, 118) note that “The [corrupt] nexus between officials, contractors and councillors was the object of recurring complaints by women MCs against their male counterparts, especially in Mumbai and Delhi.”

This division is reinforced by the hard rule within Mumbai’s ruling Shiv Sena party that only men are allowed to ask for and handle money (Bedi, 2016, p.90). While this rule was intended to keep men in control of the party, it means that men focus on the financial side of the party’s activities, and are viewed

---

<sup>9</sup>See also Goyal (2020a) on the close relation between gender, quotas and political networks.

as less approachable since they are more likely to demand money in return for any favors done. As [Bedi \(2016, p.91\)](#) remarks, “Local residents simply assumed that male Siv Sainiks associated with money and fundraising would generally also use some of that money for personal profit. However, Shiv Sena women were generally seen as above corruptibility...[and] more trustworthy than their male counterparts. Therefore, they were the ones who emerge as local protectors of the neighborhood”. This division extends to formal institutions as well, with women being excluded from the corporation committees with financial power, and instead tracked towards the education and public health committees, a “gender segregation in public affairs [that] neatly reflects the traditional division of responsibility within households” ([Holzner and de Wit, 2003, 21](#)).

Though they sometimes chafed at these restrictions, women saw some benefits from this division of gender roles. While the role of a powerful, ambitious woman might be viewed by both male colleagues and voters as threatening, the role of “social worker” is one that is compatible with traditional female gender roles, is valued within the broader community and does not encroach on the central position of men in the party system. While women who attempt to challenge male politicians are subtly sanctioned, those who focus on working within formal institutions to provide public services are can make contributions that go beyond those of most male politicians [Bedi \(2016, 85-6\)](#). [Holzner and de Wit \(2003, 21-22\)](#) similarly find that female corporators focus on “health, education and income” and that the issues most important to them are “water supply, street traffic problems, pollution, solid waste management, [and] liquor shops”. The issues they dealt with are related to school admissions and violence against women rather than jobs or real estate.

In some cases, this gendered division of labor occurred within the household, with a female corporator’s husband or male relatives handling the financial or clientelist side of the job ([De Wit, 2016, 220](#)). Note, however, that this implies that effort spent on formal public service would rise relative to the man attempting to handle both aspects of the job himself. One Bangalore corporator’s husband even bragged of this feature of reservation, saying that his wife’s constituents “get two for the price of one” ([John, 2007, 3989](#)).

The bias against women operating in male gendered spaces extends to women’s attempts to intervene in corporation debates, as it does in other public contexts in India ([Brulé, 2015](#)). Female corporators report instances of “ridiculing, interrupting, threatening with sexual violence” ([Holzner and de Wit, 2003, 20](#)). One female corporator boasted to [Bedi \(2016, 68-9\)](#) about being the only woman “who had the courage to stand

up and address the mayor.” Adopting a “chamber-centered” strategy of rhetorical positioning is thus less beneficial for women than for men.

### **3.4 Gender Quotas in Mumbai Politics: Skill and Incentives**

Several aspects of Indian local politics influence the possible effect of quotas on the incentives of members to provide services to their constituents. One is that the chances of reelection for both men and women are very low, and that there is little difference in these chances across genders. While reelection rates are quite low in India even in elections without reservation (Lee, 2019), much of the low rate of reelection is associated with the structure of the quotas themselves, which act as a set of randomized term limits. Since quotas are reassigned after every election, members are guaranteed to have at least a 50% chance of being placed in a different reservation category, to say nothing of the chances that a redistribution of seats will place them in a seat with a good deal of new territory or a different caste reservation status. Overall, in Mumbai only 13.2% of members were reelected in 2012 (11.6% of quota members and 14.4% of non-quota members).

If reelection only weakly incentivizes members, partisanship provides some compensating motivation. Corporators are often nominated by their party to run for the state assembly, a more prestigious and desirable office: In the 2014 Maharashtra elections, 14 current or former Mumbai corporators were nominated, and even more sought nomination.<sup>10</sup> Men, who are more likely to be viewed as suitable for higher office, are thus more likely to feel this pressure – in 2014, only 6.4% of state legislators were women. Goyal (2020b, 19-20) finds that male local councilors in Delhi are substantially more likely than female councilors to be nominated for state-level elections.

We should thus expect men to have higher incentives for good performance in years immediately before state elections. This is not because of any change in the institutional structure of the corporation, but because in these years candidates anxious to leave the corporation for the state legislature are likely to be seeking to impress both voters and party leaders. Since men are much more likely to be able to run for the legislature, they should be especially influenced by this political business cycle.

If women have little chance of either reelection or promotion, why do they bother working at all? While women have more limited electoral options after their first term, for both men and women electoral office is not the only, or even the primary, reward for political participation. For most corporators their time in office

---

<sup>10</sup><https://tinyurl.com/Councillor-Bags-Tickets> (Accessed 10/29/19).

is but one part of a career as a party worker or political broker, which may also include nominated posts, paid employment for the party office, or more informal money making opportunities linked to their political connections (Bedi, 2016). For these reasons, corporators have strong incentives to win the approval of party leaders even when reelection is unlikely.

In Mumbai we find some evidence that quota women have lower levels of observable variables thought to be correlated with “skill,” though these patterns are not as strong as those seen in village elections. Panel A in Table A.3 on page A-3 shows that quota members have levels of university education and household wealth that are very similar to other candidates. Quota candidates are less likely to possess a Permanent Account Number (PAN)—a number given to all Indian taxpayers to indicate participation in the formal economy, and which Karekurve-Ramachandra and Lee (2019) use as a negative indicator of “proxy candidates” put forward by male relatives. They are also less likely to have completed high school and are younger. If these factors are correlated with politician performance, gender quotas should have a negative effect on constituency services.

## 4 Data and Estimation

To measure constituency service and legislator effort, we use a large new dataset collected by a non-partisan, voluntary Indian nonprofit organization, Praja Foundation. Praja aims to “undertake extensive research and highlight civic issues to build the awareness of, and mobilize action by the government and elected representatives”. The data used for this paper come from Praja’s “Municipal Councillor Report Card” project, which aims to assign grades to the performance of each local legislator every year. To assign the grades, Praja collected a wide range of numerical data, the bulk of it via “Right to Information” requests with the local municipal corporation of Mumbai. Praja began collecting data in Mumbai in 2011, and did not collect data in election years (Panel B in Table A.1 on page A-1 summarizes the data collection efforts by Praja). Consequently, we have six years of data spread across three election cycles for each constituency in Mumbai (2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2018).



## 4.1 Measuring Legislator Effort

We analyze several measures of legislator effort — the amount of time and energy they appear to invest in doing specific activities — with a focus on measuring legislative effort on public services, effort in the chamber, and effort expended on the politician’s own personal interests, such as pay and perks.

Our most important measure of the distribution of effort is the distribution of questions asked by legislators in the chamber. As in many parliamentary systems, questions are used both to bring a specific issue to public attention, or to force the executive to act on (or at least respond to) a grievance. By categorizing questions asked and comparing them to the total number, we can also get a rough sense of what types of representational activities members consider worth their time. We divide questions into four types.<sup>11</sup> *Corporation-related* questions concern the internal operations and privileges of the corporation itself. *Public goods* questions concern the provision of broadly beneficial, non-excludable goods.<sup>12</sup> *Individual* goods benefit only an individual, and are often given conditionally, in return for political support.<sup>13</sup> Finally *symbolic* goods concern cultural and identity issues rather than material benefits.<sup>14</sup> Given the importance of identity issues in shaping partisanship in Mumbai, symbolic questions are quite common—in 2018, 12% of questions concerned renaming streets alone. In the analysis, we categorize the proportion of public goods questions as constituency service, and symbolic questions as effort in the chamber.

Two additional measures capture behavior in the legislative chamber, and effort put towards attention seeking through legislative activity. The most obvious of these are attendance at corporation meetings, calculated as a proportion of total meetings. There is considerable variation in attendance: Average yearly attendance in Mumbai was 77% at corporation meetings and 76% at ward meetings, and only a third of members had attendance rates above 90%. To capture whether members actually participate in a valuable manner when they are attending, we use the total number of questions asked annually (the denominator for the measures discussed above).

As an additional measure of effort expended on constituency service, we use attendance at ward meetings, where narrowly local matters are discussed, and which are thought to be unimportant to members relative to the main chamber, particularly to members interested in visibility outside their own ward (De Wit,

---

<sup>11</sup>Praja categorized questions into near 100 highly specific categories, which we have consolidated to 17, and then grouped into four.

<sup>12</sup>Education, health, infrastructure, pollution and garbage, recreation and community centers, transport and water and toilets.

<sup>13</sup>Food distribution, housing, government jobs, and licensing.

<sup>14</sup>Street renaming, crime and corruption and “culture.” Note that crime questions are only symbolic because the corporation does not control the police.

2016). Further, each corporator receives a set amount of money each year, which they can distribute to public projects at their discretion and our data set also has information on proportion of constituency development funds expended by each councilor during their term in office. As [Keefer and Khemani \(2009\)](#) note in their study of similar funds at the national level, the disbursement of these funds requires a good deal of work by the legislator, since the disbursal of the funds and implementation of the resulting projects are multi-step bureaucratic processes that may not result in observable outputs before reelection. As a result, large amounts of money go unspent or utilized towards projects that have a quick turnaround time with limited long term impact. In Mumbai, the utilization rate was 81% in 2018 (immediately after an election), and 55% in 2016 (immediately before an election).

## **4.2 Measuring Performance Outcomes**

While our main outcome variable related to legislator effort across different dimensions, we supplemented this with measures of popularity and responsiveness of elected representatives. Since constituency service is a “predominant activity” of elected representatives in India ([Bussell, 2019](#)), we focus on member performance in bringing public services to their constituency. We measure the quality of local public services along two categories: Citizen perception of constituency service and their responsiveness in handling of citizen complaints.

### **Citizen Perception of Constituency Service:**

To measure member effectiveness in enhancing civic and public utility service activities, Praja surveyed each constituency in every non-election year to access local opinion of the elected corporator. Due to privacy concerns, we were unable to obtain the original individual responses to the survey. The survey sampled an average anywhere between 100 to 107 respondents across all the 227 constituencies (a total of 22,700 to 24,500 respondents) in every non-election year starting from 2011. Overall, the survey sample included both men and women split, matched, and compared to the population values of Mumbai sample in the Indian Readership Survey – another flagship survey of the survey organization that has an annual sample size of more than 200,000 per year across India. The demographic deviations, if any, for the Praja survey were corrected using the Indian Readership Survey as the baseline ([Foundation, 2011](#), p. 157). The full survey research design and weighting criteria can be accessed from the annual councilor report cards on the Praja website (<https://www.praja.org/report-card>). We were able to obtain constituency-level means for answers

to a these wide variety of questions. Since some questions were added to the survey after the first wave by Praja, we cannot use constituency fixed effects in all models.<sup>15</sup>

The questions in the survey are about resident perceptions of conditions in policy areas relevant to the corporation, and overall perceptions of the member. Each of these questions is thus the percentage of individuals with a favorable impression of various local public services or problems, or of the members performance on other issues of day-to-day relevance. These perception measures are captured via fourteen outcomes<sup>16</sup> and each of these outcomes are positively correlated. Consistent with the idea that the corporators have some influence over these outcomes and following standard political economy models of election cycles, impressions are slightly more favorable in years immediately before elections relative to other years.

Our use of perception-based measures might raise concerns about residents misjudging the performance of members systematically. For instance, a popular corporator may give favorable impression of their performance, irrespective of their actual influence on service delivery. This concern could be exacerbated because the subjective assessments of residents might be correlated with corporator gender, though this would tend to bias us towards finding negative quota effects rather than positive ones.<sup>17</sup>

**Handling of Citizen Complaints:** As a more “objective” measure of corporator performance, untainted by gendered citizen perceptions, we use the handling of citizen complaints. We view the quick resolution of complaints as unambiguously desirable, especially given that the complaints that we are analyzing are overwhelmingly focused on local quality of life issues. Mumbai residents can submit complaints in-person or electronically to the office of their local administrative ward. The corporators elected from that ward make up the governing committee with broad discretion over their internal operations. Our key independent variable in this analysis is thus the *proportion* of women on the administrative ward committee. Binary measures of the presence of critical numbers of women in ward committees, designed to measure non-linear group dynamics, produce results in the same direction but are not statistically significant. (Appendix Table A.13 on page A-11)

---

<sup>15</sup>These models would have no within-unit variation for some measures.

<sup>16</sup>The fourteen different outcomes are quality and/or condition of roads, traffic and congestion in the city, public gardens, public transport, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools and colleges, water supply, and water logging during rainy season and perception of cleanliness and sanitation, the corporator’s accessibility, the corporator’s (lack of) corruption, overall corporator approval, recall for corporator’s name and perceived improvements in lifestyle. These components are positively correlated with Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.87. We have excluded “Recall Party Name” from these indices as this measure is theoretically separate from citizen perception about the elected councilor.

<sup>17</sup>Government officials and other functionaries are biased in their views about elected women especially with respect to their competence as representatives (Purohit, 2021). Further, Clayton (2015), Brulé (2020) and others demonstrate backlash effects against women to infraction of conventional gender norms.

To analyze the effect of gender quotas on complaint resolution, we gathered data on civic complaints lodged by citizens to the Mumbai council. Our data had more than 470,000 individual complaints. We analyzed those complaints that were resolved and marked as “closed” by the local corporation. This left us with more than 370,000 complaints, along with the amount of time taken to resolve them. The local council collected these self-reported individual complaints across 215 types that we matched to the 14 categories that are provided in the complaints portal of the Mumbai local council.<sup>18</sup> To alleviate concerns regarding the very nature of complaint resolution i.e., gender quota or non-gender quota members may systematically differ in terms of the number of complaints that go “unresolved” due to differential constituent expectations, we conducted an additional test using the count of complaints that went unresolved. The distribution of the count of the complaint by year is shown in [A.6 on page A-5](#). We found no evidence of gender quotas having an effect on the proportion of complaints that went unresolved in wards and we report these findings in [figure A.2 on page A-13](#).<sup>19</sup>

The unit of observation for complaints data is the administrative ward-year, rather than the constituency-year (our unit of treatment) since the complaints are collected at the administrative ward-level.<sup>20</sup> For each complaint type we calculated the average number of days taken to resolve the issue at the administrative-ward level and then reshaped the data from complaint-year level to administrative-ward-year level. This resulted in a panel of 24 administrative wards covering six years and three election cycles. [Table A.7 on page A-5](#) summarizes this classification.

### 4.3 Estimation

Estimating the effect of quotas on outcomes is straightforward as quotas are assigned randomly. Randomization solves the problem of selection bias – the possibility that quotas are imposed in constituencies with a proclivity for female representatives – and ensures that the difference in means between treated and control

---

<sup>18</sup>While there are 18 different categories, we dropped 4 categories of complaints (Estate, Schools, Colony, and Miscellaneous). The first three categories had negligible/no observations for multiple years, whereas “Miscellaneous” was an umbrella term used to record issues with no clear indication of the precise type of the complaint.

<sup>19</sup>However, it must be noted that in one area where gender-quota candidates do better (such as health), they face higher constituent expectations resulting in more complains and hence larger number of unresolved complaints. This could potentially be a function of receiving marginally difficult nature of complaints. That said, we only notice this only for one complaint area – health – and ex-ante we did not have a prior hypothesis regarding this particular policy area

<sup>20</sup>Each administrative ward is composed of 2-15 electoral wards (constituencies, the treatment unit). [Table A.2](#) provides the latest mapping between zones, administrative-wards, and constituencies. The civic complaints system — introduced in year 2000 allows citizens to lodge complaints to a central complaints registration system via phone, in-person, or online — aggregates the complaints received at the administrative ward level. Therefore, the unit of analysis for the complaint data is the administrative ward-year level. [Table A.2 on page A-2](#) provides a mapping between zones, electoral and administrative wards in Mumbai.

constituencies is equivalent to the causal effect of quota imposition. It must be emphasized that we are estimating the effect of gender quotas, rather than the effect of gender, since some women do contest in unreserved seats.<sup>21</sup> Note also that we are estimating the effects of gender quotas at the constituency level in the context of a system where quotas are being imposed, and do not observe outcomes in the counterfactual world where there are no gender quotas.

We are interested in estimating the overall effect of quotas on legislator effort. Further, we also want to explore how this translates to performance across all policy areas in terms of citizen perception and time taken to resolve citizen complaints. Specifically, we estimate the average treatment effect across all measures within families of outcomes. As described in section 4, the data we employ allows us do exactly this – with families of legislator effort measures, family of citizen perception of constituency service delivered by the corporators and complaint processing time while handling citizen complaints to the Mumbai local council.

Since our effort, citizen perception, and complaint measures are captured across different dimensions, separately testing for every outcome could result in multiple inference problems.<sup>22</sup> To overcome these issues we follow the summary index approach outlined by Anderson (2008) where we calculate a weighted mean of standardized outcomes by weighting the outcomes with the inverse of the covariance matrix. This inverse covariance weighting “maximizes the amount of information captured in the index” (Anderson, 2008; Samii, 2016).<sup>23</sup> This approach allow us to test for the overall effect of gender quotas and is robust to overtesting. We do report the full set of results for all outcomes individually in the appendix with term clustered standard errors.

---

<sup>21</sup> Approximately ten percent of winners in unreserved seats in Mumbai in our sample were women.

<sup>22</sup>The following simple illustration describes the multiple inference problem. Suppose the researcher chosen significance level is  $\alpha = 0.05$  and the number of hypotheses is 12. Now,

$$\begin{aligned} Pr(\text{at least one significant result}) &= 1 - Pr(\text{no significant results}) \\ &= 1 - (1 - 0.05)^{12} \\ &\approx 45.9\% \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, this leads to a 46% chance of observing significance on one of the hypothesis tests purely by chance.

<sup>23</sup>We use the stepdown adjusted p-values procedure proposed by Romano and Wolf (2005), which fixes family wise error rate and reduces the propensity to commit type I errors. As described by Clarke, Mühlrad et al. (2016) this procedure “ (...) penalises p-values to account for multiple hypothesis testing, and does so in an efficient way which allows for arbitrary correlations between outcome variables.” Appendix B in Clarke, Mühlrad et al. (2016) provides a technical summary of the Romano and Wolf (2005) step-down technique, whereas Romano and Wolf (2016) provides the full details. The Romano-Wolf correction is more powerful than other multiple hypothesis testing procedures such as Bonferroni and Holm corrections (Clarke, Romano and Wolf, 2019). The actual process of p-value correction was done using the procedure via the algorithm described in Romano and Wolf (2016). While we report conventional p-values, statistical significance in all our results in table 2 are based on corrected Romano-Wolf p-values obtained after 5000 bootstrap replications.

**Legislator effort:** Consequently, we estimate the regression equation 1 to measure the effects of gender quotas on legislator effort, focusing on the causal effect of the gender quota dummy on the summary index.<sup>24</sup>

$$EffortIndex_{cy} = \lambda_y + \gamma_c + \delta D_{cy} + \varepsilon_{cy}, \quad (1)$$

where  $effort_{index}_{cy}$  is the constituency-year level effort measures that are aggregated into summary indices for different types of questions asked in the chamber as described earlier.<sup>25</sup> The components of the summary outcome variable for legislator effort are tabulated in panel D of table A.3.  $\lambda_y$  refers to a vector of year fixed effects,  $\gamma_c$  refers to the vector of constituency fixed effects,  $D_{yc}$  is the dummy that is 1 in constituency years when gender quotas are imposed and 0 otherwise;  $\delta$  is the coefficient of interest that captures the effect of gender quotas and  $\varepsilon_{cy}$  is the error term.

**Citizen Perception of Constituency Service:** Regression equation 2 measures the effects of gender quota on citizen perception of elected councilors,

$$ConstOpinion_{cy} = \lambda_y + \gamma_c + \delta D_{cy} + \varepsilon_{cy}, \quad (2)$$

where  $ConstOpinion_{cy}$  is the constituency-year level citizen perception measures that are aggregated into a summary index as described earlier. The components of the summary outcome variable for citizen perception of delivery of constituency service are tabulated in panel B of table A.3.  $\lambda_y$  refers to a vector of year fixed effects,  $\gamma_c$  refers to the vector of constituency fixed effects,  $D_{yc}$  is the dummy that is 1 in constituency years when gender quotas are imposed and 0 otherwise;  $\delta$  is the coefficient of interest that captures the effect of gender quotas and  $\varepsilon_{cy}$  is the error term.

**Complaint Processing time:** To estimate the effect of gender quotas on time taken to resolve civic complaints, we again follow the summary index approach. The components of the complaints index come from the complaint types described in table A.12 on page A-8. Therefore, we estimate equation 3 to measure the effect of gender quotas on complaint resolution.

$$ComplaintTime_{wy} = \lambda_y + \gamma_w + \delta P_{wy} + \varepsilon_{wy}, \quad (3)$$

where  $ComplaintTime_{wy}$  is the index of complaints at the administrative ward-year level,  $\lambda_y$  refers to a vector of year fixed effects,  $\gamma_w$  refers to a vector of admin-ward fixed effects,  $\delta$  is the coefficient of interest that captures the effect of gender quotas and  $\varepsilon_{wy}$  is the error term. This equation differs from equation

<sup>24</sup>It is important to note that the regression coefficient for the summary index is not equivalent to an average of the regression coefficients for the underlying measures, since the summary index is a weighted average that gives more weight to measures that are uncorrelated with the others.

<sup>25</sup>In addition, we also use individual measures such as ward attendance, total questions asked, proportion of constituency development funds disbursed, and corporation meetings attended

2 with respect to the independent variable  $P_{wy}$ . This variable captures the proportion of quota seats in administrative ward  $w$  in year  $y$ . This is necessitated by the ward structure and nature of complaint collection by the local council, the independent variable for complaint models is the proportion of constituencies in the ward that have quotas.

While legislator performance outcomes, citizen perception, and complaint resolution time in days are measured annually, quota assignment (treatment variable) and politician attributes are uniform within terms.<sup>26</sup> To account for this, all standard errors in our models are clustered at the constituency-term level (or administrative-ward level for complaint models) – which corresponds to the identifying source of variation. Further, all models include year fixed effects, to account for the changing quotas in Mumbai and ward fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the ward level. Constituency fixed effects are included in the perception models wherever data collection was complete for all years. These models discard observations after the boundary changes of 2017.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Differences in Member Effort

Legislators can exert effort in several ways, including public service provision, individual goods provision, rhetorical and chamber performance, and on maximizing their own perks. We utilize multiple measures to capture these families of outcomes, including questions asked by the councilors, proportion of constituency development funds deployed and effort expended towards legislative activity. In our initial analysis we focus on question content, creating separate summary indices for our four types of questions: rhetorical, public goods, individual, and symbolic. These are measures of *relative* participation: as we will see, the strong gender norms of the chamber mean that women ask fewer questions overall. We are also agnostic as to whether these questions actually influence policy directly, or are simply proxies of member interests (and, hence, their out-of-chamber activities).

Table 1 shows the results of the question content analysis. Gender quota candidates are less involved (mean negative effect of 0.14 standard deviation units at 95% confidence level) in asking questions that are rhetorical or symbolic nature or pertaining to identity politics, such as the renaming of streets or landmarks.

---

<sup>26</sup>The small number of constituencies with by-elections were dropped in years after the death or unseating of the original member.

Gender quota candidates are less involved in asking questions related to goods that benefit individuals (usually in exchange for political favors) as opposed to the community at large. Panel C shows that quotas have mean negative effect of 0.09 standard deviation units on the proportional importance of these questions. Finally, we find that gender quota candidates are 0.2 standard units (at 95% confidence level) less likely to ask questions related to the city corporation itself, our best metric of individual privilege seeking.

In contrast, we find no statistically significant difference between gender quota candidates and non-gender quota candidates when it comes to raising questions related to public goods. While Figure A.3 shows that quotas have a positive and significant effect on specific types of public good questions that in previous studies have been found to be of importance to Indian women, including health, toilets and water, and education, the average overall effect on asking questions related to public services is close to zero.

As Table 3 shows, quotas members are overall less likely to exert effort in the legislative chamber and more likely to exert effort in their constituencies. Panel A shows that members are more likely to spend time on constituency development activities. Our two main measures of this are attendance at administrative ward meetings and deployment of constituency development funds. We find an overall positive average significant effect, which is entirely driven by the increase in ward attendance. There is no systematic difference in terms of constituency development funds, perhaps an indication of the challenges in *actually* deploying these funds in the face of a hostile bureaucracy (Keefer and Khemani, 2009). While quota members are more engaged at the ward level, they are less engaged in the corporation chamber, being no more likely to attend corporation meetings and less likely to ask questions while there (Table 3, Panel B).

Note that the higher level of ward committee attendance by quota members provides a very intuitive explanation for why ward committees with a large number of quota members process complaints faster. A member who does not bother to attend ward meetings will have relatively little opportunity to pressure the ward bureaucracy to process complaints rapidly.



**Table 1: Gender Quotas and Questions Raised**

	<i>Dep. Var:</i> Index of Questions Raised in the Chamber		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gender Quota	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.026*** (0.009)
Gender Quota × State Election			0.005 (0.016)
Constant	0.008 (0.009)	0.096*** (0.025)	0.009 (0.009)
Observations	1,362	1,135	1,362
R-squared	0.016	0.280	0.016
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	✗

Cluster-Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: All the models include a summary index of questions raised in the chamber by the councilors as the dependent variable. The constituents of the complaints summary index are shown in panel D of table A.3 on page A-3. Year and administrative ward fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year and administrative ward-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with complaint processing. Constituency fixed effect model in (2) excludes years after 2017 as the constituency maps were redrawn making them uncomparable with previous years. Model (3) does not include constituency fixed effects to avoid multi-collinearity. Standard errors are clustered at the administrative ward-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table 2: Gender Quotas and Questions Raised in the Chamber**

<b>Panel A</b>			<b>Panel B</b>		
	Index of Rhetorical Questions Asked		Index of Questions Asked Related to Public Goods		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Gender Quota	-0.147*** (0.037) [0.0002] {0.0004}	-0.177*** (0.051) [0.006] {0.0064}	Gender Quota	-0.020 (0.025) [0.415] {0.682}	0.013 (0.030) [0.668] {0.705}
Constant	-0.030 (0.040) [0.445]	0.142 (0.091) [0.118]	Constant	-0.008 (0.023) [0.746]	0.113 (0.140) [0.418]
Observations	1,362	1,135	Observations	1,362	1,135
R-squared	0.019	0.240	R-squared	0.007	0.209
Year FE	✓	✓	Year FE	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	Const. FE	✗	✓
<b>Panel C</b>			<b>Panel D</b>		
	Index of Questions Asked Related to Individual Goods		Index of Question Asked Related to the Corporation		
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Gender Quota	-0.085** (0.035) [0.014] {.0356}	-0.054 (0.029) [0.061] {0.105}	Gender Quota	-0.185*** (0.059) [0.0005] {0.0006}	-0.236*** (0.068) [0.0006] {0.0042}
Constant	0.108** (0.045) [0.018]	0.621*** (0.040) [0.000]	Constant	-0.018 (0.081) [0.827]	0.030 (0.096) [0.759]
Observations	1,362	1,135	Observations	1,272	1,063
R-squared	0.027	0.269	R-squared	0.022	0.267
Year FE	✓	✓	Year FE	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	Const. FE	✗	✓

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are included in round brackets. To account for Family Wise Error Rates from multiple hypothesis testing we use [Romano and Wolf \(2005\)](#) p-values that are calculated using [Clarke, Romano and Wolf \(2019\)](#)'s stata package *rwolf*. Romano-Wolf p-values are presented in curly brackets, and uncorrected p-values are presented in square brackets. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, and \* p<0.1 are based on Romano-Wolf p-values. Year and constituency fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year-specific and constituency-specific shocks that could be correlated with the outcomes. Constituency fixed effects models exclude years after 2017 as the constituency maps were redrawn making them uncomparable with previous years. **Panel A:** Components of Rhetorical Questions Index are: Questions regarding renaming of streets/landmarks, crime and corruption in the city, and cultural issues. **Panel B:** Components of Public Goods Questions Index are: Questions regarding education, health, physical infrastructure, pollution, recreational and community facilities, transportation, and water supply and toilets. **Panel C:** Components of individual Goods Questions Index are: Questions regarding distribution, housing, human resources and licensing. **Panel D:** Contains linear models with questions related to corporation asked by councilors as the dependent variable.

**Table 3: Additional Effort Measures**

<b>Panel A</b>			
	Ward Attendance	Ward Attendance	Prop. of Funds Disbursed
Gender Quota	0.256*** (0.071) [0.0003] {0.0006}	0.267*** (0.077) [0.001] {0.0006}	-0.023 (0.040) [0.570] {0.0036}
Constant	0.223*** (0.061) [0.000]	-0.199 (0.142) [0.163]	0.118*** (0.042) [0.005]
Observations	1,342	1,120	1,118
R-squared	0.062	0.546	0.411
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	✗
<b>Panel B</b>			
	Corp meetings Attended	Corp meetings Attended	Total No. of Questions Asked
Gender Quota	-0.018 (0.079) [0.816] {0.823}	0.004 (0.078) [0.959] {0.967}	-0.180** (0.084) [0.033] {0.062}
Constant	0.313*** (0.060) [0.000]	-0.212 (0.278) [0.446]	0.032 (0.081) [0.694]
Observations	1,342	1,120	1,342
R-squared	0.063	0.619	0.019
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	✗

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are included in round brackets. To account for Family Wise Error Rates from multiple hypothesis testing we use Romano and Wolf (2005) p-values that are calculated using Clarke, Romano and Wolf (2019)'s stata package *rwolf*. Romano-Wolf p-values are presented in curly brackets, and uncorrected p-values are presented in square brackets. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, and \* p<0.1 are based on Romano-Wolf p-values. Year and constituency fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year-specific and constituency-specific shocks that could be correlated with the outcomes. Constituency fixed effects models exclude years after 2017 as the constituency maps were redrawn making them uncomparable with previous years.

## 5.2 Citizen Perceptions

One of the best outcomes of politician effort and indeed their success is in improving public services that is then reflected in what their constituents think/perceive. As we have have described, we utilize the constituency opinion survey administered by Praja to measure these perceptions. Panel A in Table 4 estimates the mean effect of gender quotas across our 14 perception measures.

**Table 4: Effect of Gender Quotas**

<b>Panel A</b>	Dependent Variable: Constituency Service Index	
	(1)	(2)
Gender Quota	0.0413*	0.0620**
	(0.0241)	(0.0275)
Gender Quota $\times$ State Election		-0.0609
		(0.0453)
Constant	-0.122***	-0.132***
	(0.0286)	(0.0291)
Observations	1,362	1,362
R-squared	0.045	0.0465
Year FE	✓	✓
<b>Panel B</b>	Dependent Variable: Complaints Resolution Index	
	(1)	(2)
Prop. Women in Ward	-0.695*	-0.756*
	(0.394)	(0.442)
Prop. Women in Ward $\times$ State Election		0.479
		(0.504)
Constant	-0.0967	-0.0657
	(0.208)	(0.232)
Observations	144	144
R-squared	0.353	0.354
Year and Ward FE	✓	✓

Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: **Panel A:** All the models include a summary index of constituency service as the dependent variable. The constituents of the summary index are: Quality and/or condition of roads, traffic and congestion in the city, public gardens, public transport, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools and colleges, water supply, water logging during rainy season, perception of cleanliness and sanitation, corporator's accessibility, corporator's (lack of) corruption, overall corporator approval, recall for corporator's name and improvements in lifestyle. Year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Panel B:** All the models include a summary index of complaint processing as the dependent variable. The constituents of the complaints summary index are shown in [A.12 on page A-8](#). Year and administrative ward fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year and administrative ward-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with complaint processing. Standard errors are clustered at the administrative ward-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.


The positive mean effect of 0.04 standard deviation units is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level, and indicates that gender quotas have a positive effect on citizen perception of service delivery and accessibility of the councilor of about four percentage points on average. The effects are stronger in years that are not before and after the state election, which is consistent with the idea that the overall effect is attenuated by superior career opportunities for men during these years (Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer, 2018). However, even in state election years, non-quota members only perform only very slightly better than quota members, suggesting that the incentives effect counterbalances the overall positive effect of quotas rather than dominating it. These findings suggest that the improved legislator effort due to gender quotas has an overall effect on constituency service spanning all areas, rather than just a single area.

In the first wave of their study Praja did not collect information on corporator accessibility, satisfaction with the corporator and general improvement in lifestyle, therefore the models below only include year fixed effects. Table A.8 on page A-6 in the appendix reports the results with an index where we exclude these variables from summary index. Figure 1 shows the coefficient plot for each of the components of the constituency service index. Next, to explore whether we service provisioning affects some areas more than others (Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner, 2020). We do not find any evidence for this. This is shown in table A.15 on page A-12 that shows the interaction effect between gender Quota variable with constituency level poverty.

Figure 1 on the following page shows the coefficient plot for individual outcomes of the index. Our use of the summary index approach outlined by Anderson (2008) allows us to make the causal claim that the effect of gender quota seats perform better on average than non-gender quota seats. We note that, consistent with previous studies, the positive effect of gender quotas is stronger for policy areas sometimes thought to be important to Indian women, especially schools, water provision and hospitals. However, the effects extend much more broadly, and are positive for 11 of the 14 measures.

Finally, we separately test for perceived corruption levels of the councilors and find that (Table A.11 on page A-7) there is no systematic difference in perceived corruption levels between quota and non-quota members. A separate stream of work has investigated why voters might perceive female politicians as less corrupt. While our results find no difference between quota members and non-quota members in terms of perceived levels of corruption, this may be do to the extreme cynicism of Mumbai voters who have far less satisfaction with all members' corruption levels than with any other aspect of their performance. Further probing this finding, as well as investigating causal mechanisms like the risk aversion of female politicians

**Figure 1: Effect of Gender Quotas on Constituency Service**



Note: Plot shows coefficients of linear models with individual outcomes on y-axis as the dependent variable, and gender quota dummy as the independent variable. All models include year fixed effects to absorb unobserved time invariant year-specific shocks that could be correlated with constituency service provisioning. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

etc., (Barnes and Beaulieu, 2019; Esarey and Schwandt-Bayer, 2019) is a promising avenues for future research.

### 5.3 Differences in Complaint Processing

As described in section 4.3, the Mumbai local council has a centralized complaint redressal system. While a bureaucratic machinery handles the day-to-day operations, the councilors wield considerable powers that allow them to sanction and/or initiate disciplinary measures against erring officials and direct them to prioritize particular types of activities.<sup>27</sup> We calculated the proportion of gender quota members in each administrative ward-year to assess the effects of gender-quotas on complaint resolution time. Given that longer complaint resolution times are worse for citizens, a negative coefficient in these models indicate a faster processing of the complaints. Panel B of table 4 shows that gender quotas have a beneficial impact on complaint processing times. A move from a ward with no quota corporators to on entirely made up of quota corporators would be associated with a predicated reduction in processing time of 0.69 standard deviation units, and this

<sup>27</sup>Kumar (2019) details the bureaucratic setup and the complaint resolution process in detail.

effect is statistically significant at the 90% level.<sup>28</sup> Although, the causal effect of quotas is captured by the summary index plots in figure A.1 on page A-9 show individual linear models)

In both the constituency perception models and the complaint resolution models, the coefficients show us the standard deviation unit change due to the quotas. While the former models are run on standardized perception scale, the latter is on standardized log days taken to resolve complaints. Taken together, these results show us that gender quota candidates improve broad-based public services, and dispel the notion that gender quota policies could result in ‘weaker’ candidates who may not prioritize constituency service that we encountered in our fieldwork. This pattern holds despite the fact that male candidates have stronger career incentives, and perform relatively better in years when those incentives are salient. Below, we will focus on where these differences in performance come from.

## 6 Discussion and Conclusion

Our results show that the imposition of gender quotas is associated with differences in behavior between male and female representatives, and where they exert effort. Quota women attend more ward meetings, while non-quota members ask more questions in the corporation, and focus those questions on individual goods, symbolic issues, and the corporation itself. Quota members adopt political strategies focused on local service provision, while other predominately male members focus on public visibility and brokerage. While non-quota members are not “mediocre” (at least on the small set of observables we measure), they appear to pursue political strategies that are less likely to have positive spillovers for their constituents.

We have less direct evidence of why quota candidates allocate effort in this way. However, we find some evidence that this is due to differences in ability to pursue clientelist and rhetorical strategies. Qualitative accounts suggest that women are excluded from the male-gendered networks of money, crime and jobs that make up much of the political game in Indian cities, a claim backed by their low levels of criminal charges. Female participation in the bombastic, performative, politics of legislative chambers is also devalored—a finding that echoes research in developed democracies. Quota women, determined to make their mark, turn to the “official” channels of constituency service and advocacy.

---

<sup>28</sup>Recall that this analysis is restricted to those complaints that were resolved and marked as “closed” and we did have about 100,000 complaints that were unresolved for various reasons. However, our models did not show any significant differences between genderquota and non-genderquota seats with respect to resolution (irrespective of time it took) of complaints. (Figure A.2 on page A-13 shows the coefficient plot of proportion of unresolved complaints by complaint category.

These differences in effort also seem to be associated in improvements in the quality of local public services. Citizen complaints are processed faster in areas with quotas, and citizens are slightly more likely to positively assess the quality of service provision in their constituencies. While these positive effects are strongest in categories that might plausibly be of special importance to Indian women, they also can be seen for types of goods that benefit men and women, and in overall averages. Gender quotas are public goods enhancing, not simply redistributive.

These estimates may be a lower bound for the effect of quotas. For one thing, quota women are performing well despite relatively weak formal incentives. All members are constrained by the relatively low chance of reelection (due, in part, to quotas), and the limited power of individual members in the corporation. Women have even lower level of incentives than men due to their smaller chances of winning election at the state and national levels. In addition, estimating the effect of quota women on complaint processing is complicated by the multi-gender composition of ward committees. Finally, it is possible that some women may be “proxy” candidates, manipulated by spouses or male relatives. However, despite these all these problems, quota members appear to perform better than their non-quota peers, rather than worse.

In policy terms, however, the results are guardedly hopeful. While gender quotas do not appear to have jolted the local politics of Mumbai to higher levels of performance, they also have not led to the efficiency losses and elite capture as predicted by some observers. Changes in descriptive representation do not need to be “bought” with poorer performance—quite the opposite.



## References

- Afridi, Farzana, Vegard Iversen and MR Sharan. 2017. "Women political leaders, corruption, and learning: Evidence from a large public program in India." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 66(1):1–30.
- Anderson, Michael L. 2008. "Multiple inference and gender differences in the effects of early intervention: A reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects." *Journal of the American statistical Association* 103(484):1481–1495.
- Anzia, Sarah F and Christopher R Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson effect: why do congresswomen outperform congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):478–493.
- Auerbach, Adam Michael and Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner. 2020. "The geography of citizenship practice: How the poor engage the state in rural and urban india." *Perspectives on Politics* 18(4):1118–1134.
- Baltrunaite, Audinga, Piera Bello, Alessandra Casarico and Paola Profeta. 2014. "Gender quotas and the quality of politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 118:62–74.
- Ban, Radu and Vijayendra Rao. 2008. "Tokenism or agency? The impact of women's reservations on village democracies in south India." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 56(3):501–530.
- Ban, Radu and Vijayendra Rao. 2009. *Is deliberation equitable? Evidence from transcripts of village meetings in south India*. The World Bank.
- Bardhan, Pranab K, Dilip Mookherjee and Monica Parra Torrado. 2010. "Impact of political reservations in West Bengal local governments on anti-poverty targeting." *Journal of Globalization and development* 1(1).
- Barnes, Tiffany D and Emily Beaulieu. 2019. "Women politicians, institutions, and perceptions of corruption." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(1):134–167.
- Barnes, Tiffany D and Mirya R Holman. 2020. "Gender quotas, women's representation, and legislative diversity." *The Journal of Politics* 82(4):1271–1286.
- Beaman, Lori, Raghavendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova. 2009. "Powerful women: does exposure reduce bias?" *The Quarterly journal of economics* 124(4):1497–1540.

- Bedi, Tarini. 2016. *The dashing ladies of Shiv Sena: political matronage in urbanizing India*. SUNY Press.
- Besley, Timothy, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson and Johanna Rickne. 2017. "Gender quotas and the crisis of the mediocre man: Theory and evidence from Sweden." *American economic review* 107(8):2204–42.
- Bhalotra, Sonia, Irma Clots-Figueras and Lakshmi Iyer. 2018. "Pathbreakers? Women's electoral success and future political participation." *The Economic Journal* 128(613):1844–1878.
- Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. "Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural experiment in India." *American Political Science Review* 103(01):23–35.
- Brulé, Rachel. 2015. "Accountability in Rural India: Local Government and Social Equality." *Asian Survey* 55(5):909–941.
- Brulé, Rachel E. 2020. "Reform, Representation, and Resistance: The Politics of Property Rights' Enforcement." *The Journal of Politics* 82(4):1390–1405.
- Bussell, Jennifer. 2019. *Clients and constituents: Political responsiveness in patronage democracies*. Cambridge Univ Press.
- Chattopadhyay, Raghavendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72(5):1409–1443.
- Cheema, Ali, Sarah Khan, Asad Liaqat and Shandana Khan Mohmand. 2021. "Canvassing the Gatekeepers: A Field Experiment to Increase Women Voters' Turnout in Pakistan." *American Political Science Review* pp. 1–21.
- Clarke, Damian, Hanna Mühlrad et al. 2016. The impact of abortion legalization on fertility and female empowerment: new evidence from Mexico. Technical report Working Paper <https://ideas.repec.org/p/csa/wpaper/2016-33.html>.
- Clarke, Damian, Joseph P Romano and Michael Wolf. 2019. "The romano-wolf multiple hypothesis correction in stata."
- Clayton, Amanda. 2015. "Women's political engagement under quota-mandated female representation: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(3):333–369.

- Clayton, Amanda and Pär Zetterberg. 2018. "Quota shocks: Electoral gender quotas and government spending priorities worldwide." *The Journal of Politics* 80(3):916–932.
- Clayton, Amanda and Pär Zetterberg. 2021. "Gender and party discipline: evidence from Africa's emerging party systems." *American Political Science Review* 115(3):869–884.
- Clots-Figueras, Irma. 2011. "Women in politics: Evidence from the Indian States." *Journal of public Economics* 95(7-8):664–690.
- Daby, Mariela. 2020. "The Gender Gap in Political Clientelism: Problem-Solving Networks and the Division of Political Work in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* p. 0010414020926194.
- De Wit, Joop. 2016. *Urban poverty, local governance and everyday politics in Mumbai*. Routledge India.
- Ejdemyr, Simon, Eric Kramon and Amanda Lea Robinson. 2017. "Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Distributive Goods<sup>1</sup>." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(9):1111–1143.
- Esarey, Justin and Leslie A Schwindt-Bayer. 2019. "Estimating causal relationships between women's representation in government and corruption." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(11):1713–1741.
- Fenno, Richard F. 2003. "Home Style: House Members in Their Districts New York."
- Ferreira, Fernando and Joseph Gyourko. 2014. "Does gender matter for political leadership? The case of US mayors." *Journal of Public Economics* 112:24–39.
- Foundation, Praja. 2011. Mumbai Report Card: Municipal Councillors 2011. Technical report Praja Foundation [https://www.praja.org/praja\\_docs/praja\\_downloads/Mumbai%20MLA%20Report%20Card\\_2011.pdf](https://www.praja.org/praja_docs/praja_downloads/Mumbai%20MLA%20Report%20Card_2011.pdf).
- Franceschet, Susan and Jennifer M Piscopo. 2008. "Gender quotas and women's substantive representation: Lessons from Argentina." *Politics & Gender* 4(3):393–425.
- Ghosh, Archana and Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal. 2005. *Democratization in progress: women and local politics in urban India*. Tulika Print Communication Services Pvt., Limited.
- Goyal, Tanushree. 2020a. "How Women Mobilize Women Into Politics: A Natural Experiment in India." Available at SSRN 3583693 .

- Goyal, Tanushree. 2020b. “Local Female Representation as a Pathway to Power: A Natural Experiment in India.” *SSRN* [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3590118](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590118).
- Gupta, Akhil. 2012. *Red tape: Bureaucracy, structural violence, and poverty in India*. Duke University Press.
- Gupta, Pranav and Pradeep Chhibber. 2022. “Bureaucratic connections and local development: A study of Palwal district in India.” *Regional & Federal Studies* pp. 1–25.
- Holzner, Brigitte and Joop JW de Wit. 2003. “Supporting decentralised urban governance: training women municipal councillors in Mumbai, India.” *ISS Working Papers* <https://repub.eur.nl/pub/19145/wp386.pdf> 386:1–38.
- Htun, Mala. 2004. “Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups.” *Perspectives on Politics* 2(3):439–458.
- Iyer, Lakshmi, Anandi Mani, Prachi Mishra and Petia Topalova. 2012. “The power of political voice: women’s political representation and crime in India.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4(4):165–193.
- Jensenius, Francesca R. 2016. “Competing inequalities? On the intersection of gender and ethnicity in candidate nominations in Indian elections.” *Government and Opposition* 51(3):440–463.
- John, Mary E. 2007. “Women in power? Gender, caste and the politics of local urban governance.” *Economic and political weekly* pp. 3986–3993.
- Josefsson, Cecilia. 2014. “Who benefits from gender quotas? Assessing the impact of election procedure reform on Members of Parliament’s attributes in Uganda.” *International Political Science Review* 35(1):93–105.
- Karekurve-Ramachandra, Varun. 2020. “Gender Quotas and Upward Political Mobility in India.”
- Karekurve-Ramachandra, Varun and Alexander Lee. 2019. “Do gender quotas hurt less privileged groups? Evidence from India.” *Working Paper*.
- Karpowitz, Christopher F and Tali Mendelberg. 2014. *The silent sex: Gender, deliberation, and institutions*. Princeton University Press.

- Kaur, Komal Preet and Andrew Q Philips. 2023. "A Moveable Benefit? Spillover Effects of Quotas on Women's Numerical Representation." *Political Research Quarterly* 76(2):680–696.
- Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani. 2009. "When do legislators pass on pork? The role of political parties in determining legislator effort." *American political Science review* 103(1):99–112.
- Kishwar, Madhu. 1996. "Women and politics: Beyond quotas." *Economic and Political Weekly* pp. 2867–2874.
- Kramon, Eric and Daniel N Posner. 2016. "Ethnic Favoritism in Education in Kenya." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11:1–58.
- Krook, Mona Lena and Diana Z O'Brien. 2010. "The politics of group representation: Quotas for women and minorities worldwide." *Comparative Politics* 42(3):253–272.
- Kumar, Tanu. 2019. "How welfare can generate civic action: evidence from affordable housing in Mumbai." [Last Accessed: 26-October-2020].  
**URL:** [https://tanukumar.com/Kumar\\_APSA\\_2019.pdf](https://tanukumar.com/Kumar_APSA_2019.pdf)
- Lawless, Jennifer L. 2015. "Female Candidates and Legislators." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18:349–366.
- Lee, Alexander. 2018. "Ethnic diversity and ethnic discrimination: Explaining local public goods provision." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(10):1351–1383.
- Lee, Alexander. 2019. "Incumbency, Parties, and Legislatures: Theory and Evidence from India." *Comparative Politics* 52(2):1–21.
- Minta, Michael D and Valeria Sinclair-Chapman. 2013. "Diversity in political institutions and congressional responsiveness to minority interests." *Political Research Quarterly* 66(1):127–140.
- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2001. "Women and democracy: Cultural obstacles to equal representation." *Journal of democracy* 12(3):126–140.
- O'Brien, Diana Z. 2012. Quotas and qualifications in Uganda. In *The Impact of Gender Quotas*, ed. Diana Z O'Brien, Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook and Jennifer M Piscopo. Oxford University Press New York pp. 57–71.

- O'Brien, Diana Z and Johanna Rickne. 2016. "Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership." *American Political Science Review* 110(1):112–126.
- Prillaman, Soledad Artiz. 2017. "Strength in numbers: how women's groups close India's political gender gap." *American Journal of Political Science* .
- Purohit, Bhumi. 2021. "Can female politicians get work done? Evidence of implicit and explicit bias from bureaucrats in India." *Working Paper* .
- Raval, Sheela. 1998. "Navi Mumbai woman corporator becomes victim of a turf war." *India Today* . [Last Accessed: 14-November-2020].  
**URL:** <https://tinyurl.com/navI-douse>
- Reingold, Beth. 2003. *Representing women: Sex, gender, and legislative behavior in Arizona and California*. Univ of North Carolina Press.
- Romano, Joseph P and Michael Wolf. 2005. "Exact and approximate stepdown methods for multiple hypothesis testing." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 100(469):94–108.
- Romano, Joseph P and Michael Wolf. 2016. "Efficient computation of adjusted p-values for resampling-based stepdown multiple testing." *Statistics & Probability Letters* 113:38–40.
- Samii, Cyrus. 2016. "Inverse covariance weighting versus factor analysis." [Accessed: 3-Nov-2019].  
**URL:** <http://cyrussamii.com/?p=2177>
- Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still supermadres? Gender and the policy priorities of Latin American legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3):570–585.
- Swers, Michele L. 2002. *The difference women make: The policy impact of women in Congress*. University of Chicago Press.
- Thomas, Sue. 1991. "The impact of women on state legislative policies." *The Journal of Politics* 53(4):958–976.
- Tripp, Aili Mari and Alice Kang. 2008. "The global impact of quotas: On the fast track to increased female legislative representation." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(3):338–361.

- Vaishnav, Milan. 2017. *The market for criminality: Money, muscle and elections in India*. Yale University Press.
- Van Dijk, Tara. 2007. "Reservation in India and Substantive Gender Equality: A Mumbai Case Study." *International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities & Nations* 7(5).
- Volden, Craig, Alan E Wiseman and Dana E Wittmer. 2013. "When are women more effective lawmakers than men?" *American Journal of Political Science* 57(2):326–341.
- Walsh, Denise. 2012. Party centralization and debate conditions in South Africa. In *The impact of gender quotas*, ed. Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook and Jennifer M Piscopo. Oxford University Press pp. 119–35.
- Weeks, Ana Catalano and Lisa Baldez. 2015. "Quotas and qualifications: the impact of gender quota laws on the qualifications of legislators in the Italian parliament." *European Political Science Review: EPSR* 7(1):119.
- Weldon, S Laurel. 2002. "Beyond bodies: Institutional sources of representation for women in democratic policymaking." *The Journal of Politics* 64(4):1153–1174.

## Online Appendix

**Table A.1: Electoral and Data Summary : Mumbai**

<b>Panel A: Electoral Context</b>	
Number of Corporators	227
Major Parties	Bharatiya Janata Party, Congress Party, Shiva Sena
Groups with Caste Reservation	Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes
Gender Quota Percentage	50% since 2011
Quota Assignment	Random Lottery
<b>Panel B: Data Availability</b>	
2007	<i>Election Year</i>
2011	✓
2012	<i>Election Year</i>
2013	✓
2014	✓
2015	✓
2016	✓
2017	[Redistricting]
	<i>Election Year</i>
2018	✓



**Table A.2: Zones, Administrative Wards and Constituencies in Mumbai**

Zone	Administrative Ward	Constituency No.
Zone 1	Ward A	225—226—227— 223
	Ward B	223—224
	Ward C	220—221—222—214—215—216
	Ward D	217—218—219
	Ward E	207—208—209—210—211—212—213
Zone 2	Ward F North	172—173—174—175—176—177—178—179—180—181
	Ward F South	200—201—202—203—204—205—206
	Ward G North	182—183—184—185—186—187—188—189—190—191—192
	Ward G South	193—194—195—196—197—198—199
Zone 3	Ward H East	87—88—89—90—91—92—93—94—95—96
	Ward H West	97—98—99—100—101—102
	Ward K East	72—73—74—75—76—77—78—79—80—81—82—83—84—85—86
	Ward K West	59—60—61—62—63—64—65—66—67—68—69—70—71
Zone4	Ward P North	32—33—34—35—36—37—38—39—40—41—42—43—44—45—46—47—48—49
	Ward P South	50—51—52—53—54—55—56—57—58
	Ward R Central	9—10—11—12—13—14—15—16—17—18
	Ward R North	1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8
	Ward R South	19—20—21—22—23—24—25—26—27—28—29—30—31
Zone 5	Ward L	156—157—158—159—160—161—162—163—164—165—166—167—168—169—170—171
	Ward M East	134—135—136—137—138—139—140—141—142—143—144—145—146—147—148
	Ward M West	149—150—151—152—153—154—155
Zone 6	Ward N	123—124—125—126—127—128—129—130—131—132—133
	Ward S	109—110—111—112—113—114—115—116—117—118—119—120—121—122
	Ward T	105—106—107—108

Source: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (<https://portal.mcgm.gov.in>) and Gaurang Damani's e-governance website initiative: <https://tinyurl.com/Gaurang-Damani>

**Table A.3: Summary Statistics**

Panel A - Observable Characteristics						
	Non-Gender Quota Seats		Gender Quota Seats		Difference	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	t
Pan Card	0.98	0.15	0.89	0.31	0.08***	(5.66)
Attended University	0.39	0.49	0.44	0.50	-0.05	(-1.60)
Criminal Record	0.30	0.46	0.04	0.19	0.27***	(12.62)
age	47.60	9.11	44.47	9.53	3.13***	(5.62)
No. of Criminal Cases	0.78	1.89	0.07	0.42	0.71***	(8.65)
<i>N</i>	557		561		1118	
Panel B - Constituency Service: Citizen Perception						
	Non-Gender Quota Seats		Gender Quota Seats		Difference	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	t
Condition of Roads	66.11	9.93	65.93	10.60	0.18	(0.32)
Public Gardens	60.44	12.53	59.62	13.44	0.82	(1.16)
Traffic jams & road congestion	60.134	10.635	59.709	11.370	0.425	(0.710)
Public Transport	70.02	9.20	70.61	9.61	-0.59	(-1.15)
Hospitals	70.33	8.25	71.27	8.27	-0.94*	(-2.10)
Schools & Colleges	71.37	8.24	72.93	8.29	-1.56***	(-3.48)
Water Supply	72.52	9.50	74.23	9.59	-1.71***	(-3.31)
Water Logging	59.68	10.17	59.47	10.89	0.21	(0.37)
Sanitation	63.41	9.45	63.84	10.12	-0.43	(-0.81)
Councillor Accessibility	62.32	10.51	62.61	10.42	-0.28	(-0.46)
Satisfaction with Councillor	67.07	12.38	66.91	12.58	0.16	(0.21)
Lack of Corporator's Corruption	30.52	13.31	30.57	12.71	-0.05	(-0.07)
Improvement in Lifestyle	68.56	8.37	68.25	8.65	0.32	(0.62)
<i>N</i>	715		646		1361	
Panel C - Other Perception Measures						
	Non-Gender Quota Seats		Gender Quota Seats		Difference	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	t
Power Supply	75.937	9.717	77.556	9.978	-1.619**	(-3.026)
Instances of Crime	62.113	9.414	62.018	9.995	0.095	(0.180)
Law & Order situation	66.397	8.493	66.918	8.735	-0.521	(-1.113)
Pollution problems	59.653	10.039	59.308	10.399	0.345	(0.621)
<i>N</i>	715		646		1361	
Panel C - Questions Asked in the Chamber						
Question Topic	Non-Gender Quota Seats		Gender Quota Seats		Difference	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	t
Education	0.04	0.11	0.05	0.13	-0.01	(-1.43)
Health	0.04	0.11	0.08	0.16	-0.03***	(-4.10)
Other Infrastructure	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.00*	(2.24)
Pollution	0.09	0.15	0.10	0.16	-0.01	(-1.06)
Recreation & Community	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.07	0.00	(0.23)
Transport	0.15	0.19	0.13	0.18	0.01	(1.26)
Water & Toilets	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.14	-0.02**	(-2.87)
Corporation	0.05	0.09	0.03	0.08	0.01**	(3.12)
Distribution	0.04	0.10	0.05	0.11	-0.01	(-1.59)
Housing	0.21	0.20	0.18	0.20	0.03**	(2.84)
Human Resources	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.01*	(2.51)
License	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.00	(0.01)
Renaming of Streets etc.	0.17	0.24	0.18	0.27	-0.02	(-1.08)
Crime & Corruption	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.01***	(3.78)
Culture	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.01	(1.50)
<i>N</i>	683		589		1272	

Note: Our estimation strategy relies on comparing outcomes for gender quota and non-gender quota seats across time (2012-2018) and the Difference column compares the means in the two types of seats. Panel A describes the differences in observable characteristics of councilors, Panel B summarizes the survey – fielded by Praja Foundation – results regarding public goods provisioning in the wards, and panel C summarizes the type of questions asked by councilors in ward/corporation meetings.

**Table A.4: Covariate Balance Test**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Slum (L)	0.142 (0.150) 0.344				
Margin of Victory (L)		0.001** (0.000) 0.034			
Winning Party (L)			0.010 (0.010) 0.324		
Runner-up Party (L)				-0.005 (0.009) 0.615	
Administrative Ward (L)					-0.002 (0.005) 0.669
Constant	0.427*** (0.086)	0.377*** (0.067)	0.428*** (0.080)	0.539*** (0.081)	0.534*** (0.082)
Observations	227	227	224	227	227
R-squared	0.004	0.020	0.004	0.001	0.001

Standard errors in brackets

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: (L) indicates a lagged variable.

Models (1) -(7) are linear models for 2012 and 2007 electoral term with lagged variables. Re-districting for 2017 term does not allow us to conduct this exercise as the ward maps changed making them uncomparable.

**Table A.5: Citizen Perception of Constituency Service**

	<i>Dep. Var:</i> Constituency Service Index	
	(1)	(2)
Gender Quota	0.0413* (0.0241)	0.0620** (0.0275)
Gender Quota × State Election		-0.0609 (0.0453)
Constant	-0.122*** (0.0286)	-0.132*** (0.0291)
Observations	1,362	1,362
R-squared	0.045	0.046
Year FE	✓	✓

Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: All the models include a summary index of constituency service as the dependent variable. The constituents of the summary index are as follows: Quality and/or condition of roads, traffic and congestion in the city, public gardens, public transport, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools and colleges, water supply, water logging during rainy season. Perception of cleanliness and sanitation, corporator's accessibility, corporator's (lack of) corruption, overall corporator approval, recall for corporator's name and improvements in lifestyle. Year fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with constituency service provisioning. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.6: Total Complaints by year**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>Cum %</b>
2013	80,526	21.4
2014	53,595	14.2
2015	22,012	5.8
2016	47,549	12.6
2017	76,943	20.4
2018	96,526	25.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>377,151</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table A.7: Complaints: Family, Category, and Type**

<b>Complaint Category</b>	<b>Examples of Complaint Types</b>
Roads	Digging of Roads, Repairs of Roads, Speed Breakers
Water Supply	Burst water lines, contaminated water, shortage of water
Storm Water	Flooding during monsoon, removal of silt, replacing manhole covers
Drainage	Odor from drains, blockage of drains, repairs to sewers
Solid Waste Management	Removal of debris, garbage collection, dustbins in public spaces
Garden	Trimming of trees, fallen tree on the road
Pest Control	Fogging, mosquito nuisance
Health	Issuance of death/birth certificates, unauthorized food sellers
Buildings	Change of categorisation of buildings, unauthorised alterations to buildings
Encroachment	Nuisance due to vagrants, hawkers
Municipal	Maintenance/Repair of municipal property
Shops	Shops operating without license, shops open beyond permissible hours
License	Trade License, Unauthorized advertisements/banners
Factories	Unauthorised factories/workshops

**Table A.8: Constituency Service Index - Truncated Index**

<b>Panel A</b> <i>Dep. Var:</i> Constituency Service Index		
	(1)	(2)
Gender Quota	0.0641 (0.0435)	0.0978** (0.0469)
Gender Quotas × State Election		-0.131* (0.0680)
Constant	0.0209 (0.132)	-0.0132 (0.131)
Observations	1,135	1,135
R-squared	0.310	0.313
Year and Const. FE	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: All the models include a summary index of constituency service as the dependent variable. The constituents of the summary index are: Quality and/or condition of roads, traffic and congestion in the city, public gardens, public transport, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools and colleges, water supply, water logging during rainy season, perception of cleanliness and sanitation, corporator's (lack of) corruption, recall for corporator's name. Corporator's accessibility, overall corporator approval (satisfaction), and improvements in lifestyle are excluded from the index to allow for constituency fixed-effects. All models include year fixed effects to absorb unobserved time invariant year-specific shocks that could be correlated with constituency service provisioning. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.9: Constituency Service Index - Sans Individual Measures Index**

<i>Dep. Var:</i> Constituency Service Index - Without Individual Measures		
	(1)	(2)
Gender Quota	0.0922** (0.0449)	0.123** (0.0544)
Gender Quota × State Election		-0.0902 (0.0840)
Constant	-0.253*** (0.0627)	-0.268*** (0.0644)
Observations	1,362	1,362
R-squared	0.104	0.104
Year and Const. FE	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: All the models include a summary index of constituency service as the dependent variable. The constituents of the summary index are: Quality and/or condition of roads, traffic and congestion in the city, public gardens, public transport, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools and colleges, water supply, water logging during rainy season, perception of cleanliness and sanitation. Individual measures such as recall for corporator's name, corporator's accessibility, overall corporator approval (satisfaction), and improvements in lifestyle are excluded from the index to separate perceptions of individuals and perceptions of services. All models include year fixed effects to absorb unobserved time invariant year-specific shocks that could be correlated with constituency service provisioning. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.10: Placebo Test**

<i>Dep Var: Placebo index</i>		
	(1)	(2)
Gender Quota	0.0305 (0.0615)	0.0750 (0.0676)
Gender Quota × State Election		-0.172* (0.104)
Constant	0.258 (0.189)	0.213 (0.187)
Observations	1,135	1,135
R-squared	0.343	0.346
Year & Const FE	✓	✓

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: All the models include a summary index of placebos as the dependent variable. The constituents of the summary index are as follows: Power supply, instances of crime, law and order situation, and pollution problems. Constituency and year fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant constituency-specific and year-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with these placebo components. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.11: Perceived Corruption**

<i>Dep Var: Perceived Councilor Corruption</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gender Quota	0.0480 (0.694)	0.400 (0.692)	0.287 (1.075)
Constant	30.52*** (0.483)	27.15*** (1.085)	24.75*** (2.370)
Observations	1,361	1,361	1,134
R-squared	0.000	0.146	0.359
Year Fixed Effects	✗	✓	✓
Const. Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses


\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: Table shows linear models with perceived corruption as the dependent variable, and gender quota dummy as the independent variable. Constituency and year fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant constituency-specific and year-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with placebo test outcomes. Constituency fixed effect models exclude years after 2017 as the constituency maps were redrawn making them uncomparable with previous years. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.12: Complaint Types and Processing Time - Summary Statistics**

Complaint Type	Mean	Std Dev	Complaint Type	Mean	Std Dev
bld_change_user_res_comm	49.180	45.625	strm_cleaning_removal_of_silt	43.369	44.720
bld_heavy_leakage_from_ceiling	52.660	38.725	strm_flooding_during_monsoon	52.948	59.797
bld_unauth_alteration_bldg	67.963	64.683	strm_repair_damaged_open_swd	44.317	42.491
bld_unauth_constr_development	240.106	891.885	drain_cleaning_of_septic_tank	42.638	48.915
encl_hawkers	80.302	178.956	drain_drainage_choke_blockage	101.013	238.677
encl_municipal_land_foot_swd	95.487	152.749	drain_overflowing_drn_manhole	79.684	148.214
encl_municipal_plot	52.904	58.641	drain_repairs_to_pipe_sewers	35.805	36.675
encl_others_eclnr	26.800	26.385	drain_replacement_manhole	32.910	34.549
encl_private_land_bldg_fact	48.177	41.703	swm_collection_pt_not_attend	33.832	40.672
mun_major_repairs_to_mun_prop	46.249	48.834	swm_gbg_lorry_not_report_cove	22.555	23.605
mun_minor_repairs_to_mun_prop	42.127	44.889	swm_gbg_not_lifted_gully	32.996	44.342
shp_running_without_license	34.701	30.967	swm_gbg_not_lifted_from_road	32.794	43.516
lic_trade_without_license	46.081	39.975	swm_no_attend_public_toilets	25.405	30.505
lic_unauth_banners_advt_road	32.150	26.535	swm_non_attend_nuis_detect	33.972	40.583
lic_unauth_stalls_road_foot	57.042	55.161	swm_dustbins	30.558	29.785
col_unauth_constr_in_slum	71.677	64.540	swm_removal_of_debris	34.785	40.904
col_unauth_ext_constr	68.158	69.849	swm_silt_lifted_from_road	31.221	37.142
fac_unauth_factory_workshop	49.197	36.741	swm_sweeping_of_roads	26.374	27.275
rd_bad_patch_potholes	45.344	71.620	gdn_fallen_tree_on_road	49.277	56.907
rd_speed_breakers	50.656	51.107	gdn_lifting_of_tree_cutting	40.313	62.863
rd_street_lighting	52.624	53.048	gdn_perm_for_tree_cutting	48.047	91.255
ws_burst_water_main_lines	29.590	30.564	gdn_trimming_of_branches	61.327	92.430
ws_contaminated_water_supply	33.641	33.042	pst_fogging	39.009	45.528
ws_leaks_in_water_lines_meter	41.313	89.623	pst_mosquito_nuisance	40.632	50.819
ws_shortage_of_water_supply	56.522	153.025	pst_rat_nuisance	36.891	35.359
ws_unauth_tapping_water_conn	41.241	58.068	heal_birth_deat_cert_issue	37.773	39.043
strm_cleaning_of_open_swd	44.229	46.960	heal_others_moh	51.216	58.029
strm_cleaning_water_entrance	42.329	47.010	heal_unauth_food_sell	51.104	46.913
Observations	144		Observations	144	

**Figure A.1: Individual Complaint Resolution**



Note: Plots show linear models for individual complaints types with ward and year fixed effects to absorb unobserved administrative ward and year specific heterogeneity.





**Table A.13: Alternative Specifications**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Dep Var: Complaints Index</i>			
Total Quota Members in Admin-Ward	-0.237 (0.150)		
Median Dummy		-0.206 (0.272)	
Mean Dummy			-0.206 (0.272)
Constant	-0.184 (0.567)	-0.423 (0.554)	-0.423 (0.554)
Observations	144	144	144
R-squared	0.478	0.470	0.470
Year and Ward FE	✓	✓	✓

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: All the models include a summary index of complaint processing as the dependent variable. The constituents of the complaints summary index are shown in [A.12 on page A-8](#). “Median Dummy” refers to a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an admin-ward has more quota members than the median number of quota members in the city of Mumbai. “Mean Dummy” refers to a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an admin-ward has more gender quota members than the mean number of gender quota members in the city of Mumbai. Year and administrative ward fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year and administrative ward-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with complaint processing. Standard errors are clustered at the administrative ward-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.14: Effect of Gender Quotas on Complaint Processing**

<i>Dep. Var:</i> Complaints Index		
	(1)	(2)
Gender Quota	-0.695*	-0.756*
	(0.394)	(0.442)
Gender Quota $\times$ State Election		0.479
		(0.504)
Constant	-0.0967	-0.0657
	(0.208)	(0.232)
Observations	144	144
R-squared	0.353	0.354
Year and Ward FE	✓	✓

Cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: All the models include a summary index of complaint processing as the dependent variable. The constituents of the complaints summary index are shown in [A.12 on page A-8](#). Year and administrative ward fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year and administrative ward-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with complaint processing. Standard errors are clustered at the administrative ward-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.15: Gender Quotas and Poverty**


Gender Quotas Interaction with Ward Poverty				
Gender Quota	-0.0120	-0.0156	-0.0120	0.0373
	(-0.20)	(-0.27)	(-0.20)	(0.54)
Percentage Slum <sup>§</sup>	0.00238	-0.00466	0.00238	-1.124
	(0.04)	(-0.07)	(0.04)	(-1.03)
Gender Quota $\times$ Percentage Slum	0.0973	0.105	0.0973	0.0104
	(0.98)	(1.06)	(0.98)	(0.09)
Constant	-0.118**	-0.0160	-0.118**	0.477
	(-2.59)	(-0.42)	(-2.59)	(0.96)
Observations	1356	1356	1356	1134
Year and Ward FE	No	No	Yes	Yes

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Note: Table shows interaction of constituency service index with constituency level poverty indicators.

<sup>§</sup> Percentage Slum variable refers to Percentage of the wards classified as slums in the 2011 census. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Figure A.2: Proportion of Unresolved Complaints - Coefficient Plot**



Note: Plot shows coefficients of linear models with the summary index of proportion of unresolved complaints by categories on y-axis as the dependent variable, and gender quota dummy as the independent variable. All models include constituency and year fixed effects to absorb unobserved time invariant constituency-specific and year-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with complaints resolution. Standard errors are clustered at the adminward-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.16: Councillor Name and Party Recall- Index**


<i>Dep Var: Recall index</i>		
	(1)	(2)
Gender Quota	0.0271 (0.0581)	0.0139 (0.0794)
Before/After State Election		0.0330 (0.105)
Constant	0.612*** (0.0819)	0.618*** (0.0859)
Observations	1,134	1,134
R-squared	0.134	0.135

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Note: All the models include a summary index of councillor and party recall as the dependent variable. Year fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant shocks that could be correlated with councillor name and party recall.

**Figure A.3: Questions Raised in the Chamber - Coefficient Plot**



Note: Plot shows coefficients of linear models with the topic of questions asked on y-axis as the dependent variable, and gender quota dummy as the independent variable. All models include constituency and year fixed effects to absorb unobserved time invariant constituency-specific and year-specific shocks respectively that could be correlated with questions being raised in the chamber. Standard errors are clustered at the constituency-term level, which corresponds to the identifying source of variation.

**Table A.17: Gender Quotas and Questions Raised in the Chamber**

<b>Panel A Dep. Var: Rhetorical Questions in the Chamber</b>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Gender Quota	-0.147*** (0.037) [0.0002] {0.0004}	-0.177*** (0.051) [0.001] {}	-0.155*** (0.041) [0.002] {0.0004}
Gender Quota × State Election			0.022 (0.076) [0.771] {0.769}
Constant	-0.030 (0.040) [0.445]	0.142 (0.091) [0.118]	-0.027 (0.042) [0.529]
Observations	1,362	1,135	1,362
R-squared	0.019	0.240	0.019
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	✗
<b>Panel B Dep. Var: Questions related to Public Goods Index</b>			
	(5)	(6)	(7)
Gender Quota	-0.020 (0.025) [0.415] {0.682}	0.013 (0.030) [0.668] {}	-0.014 (0.031) [0.663] {0.682}
Gender Quota × State Election			-0.019 (0.050) [0.708] {0.7165}
Constant	-0.008 (0.023) [0.746]	0.113 (0.140) [0.418]	-0.011 (0.026) [0.676]
Observations	1,362	1,135	1,362
R-squared	0.007	0.209	0.007
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	✗
<b>Panel C Dep. Var: Questions related to Individual Goods Index</b>			
	(8)	(9)	(10)
Gender Quota	-0.085** (0.035) [0.014] {.0356}	-0.054* (0.029) [0.061] {}	-0.069** (0.033) [0.036] {.0356}
Before/After State Election			-0.049 (0.076) [0.519] {0.542}
Constant	0.108** (0.045) [0.018]	0.621*** (0.040) [0.000]	0.099** (0.044) [0.025]
Observations	1,362	1,135	1,362
R-squared	0.027	0.269	0.027
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	✗
<b>Panel C Dep. Var: Questions related to Corporation</b>			
	(11)	(12)	(13)
Gender Quota	-0.185*** (0.059) [0.0005] {0.0006}	-0.236*** (0.068) [0.001] {}	-0.229*** (0.065) [0.0005] {0.0006}
Constant	-0.018 (0.081) [0.827]	0.030 (0.096) [0.759]	0.004 (0.081) [0.962]
Observations	1,272	1,063	1,272
R-squared	0.022	0.267	0.023
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Const. FE	✗	✓	✗

Note: Cluster-robust standard errors are included in round brackets. To account for Family Wise Error Rates from multiple hypothesis testing we use Romano and Wolf (2005) p-values that are calculated using Clarke, Romano and Wolf (2019)'s stata package *rwolf*. Romano-Wolf p-values are presented in curly brackets, and uncorrected p-values are presented in square brackets. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, and \* p<0.1 are based on Romano-Wolf p-values. Year and constituency fixed effects are included to absorb unobserved time invariant year-specific and constituency-specific shocks that could be correlated with the outcomes. Constituency fixed effects models exclude years after 2017 as the constituency maps were redrawn making them uncomparable with previous years.

**Panel A:** Components of Rhetorical Questions Index are: Questions regarding renaming of streets/landmarks, crime and corruption in the city, and cultural issues. **Panel B:** Components of Public Goods Questions Index are: Questions regarding education, health, physical infrastructure, pollution, recreational and community facilities, transportation, and water supply and toilets. **Panel C:** Components of individual Goods Questions Index are: Questions regarding distribution, housing, human resources and licensing. **Panel D:** Contains linear models with questions related to corporation asked by councilors as the dependent variable.